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Overview 
 
With financial globalization, investors can gain from diversification if returns from financial 
markets are stable and not correlated. However with volatility spillovers, increase in cross-
market correlations exist as a real-effect and are not taken into account for asset allocation and 
portfolio composition. This chapter assesses financial contagion from two recent trends in the 
world economy: the global financial crisis and the 2011 Japanese natural disasters (tsunami, 
earthquake and nuclear crises).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Globalization has been recognized as the principal force dominating the economic 
universe. It upholds to illuminate the world with economic prosperity and seeks a victory of 
market over government and self-interest over altruism. No less imperative is the global 
commitment to continuing and accelerating the pace of human development, which indicate 
the culmination of the historical processes of cultural advances. The dilemma however is that, 
while the phenomenon is a lusty, ineluctable process whose march can be stopped only by 
endangering the prosperity of peoples and nations, it also threatens to disfigure development 
in the manner it is evolving. As a dynamic force for change throughout the world, it is 
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expected to stimulate unprecedented surges in the wealth of nations by extending outwards 
the world production possibility frontier and redefining world markets as a “Global Village”. 
With growing efforts toward financial liberalization, financial integration among economies 
has the benefit of improving allocation efficiency and diversifying risks. Despite these 
potential benefits, recent trends in the global economy suggest that crises in one country can 
easily spread to other countries through different channels as a result of financial 
globalization. In this chapter, we assess whether global financial markets have been 
vulnerable to contagion during some crises that have marked the global landscape in recent 
memory, notably: the 2007 global financial crisis and the 2011 Japanese tsunami, earthquake 
and nuclear crises. Hence, we aim to assess global evidence of financial market contagion 
from financial crisis and natural disasters.  
Over the past decade, the concern about regional and global integration of emerging 
equity markets has been largely debated. The recent global financial meltdown and economic 
downturn has left many analysts concerned about whether emerging markets suffered from 
contagion (Asongu, 2012a). Most of these markets were still in their infancy before the start 
of the millennium, which rendered an examination of the transmission of financial variable 
movements from global crisis somewhat impractical. Hence, the effects of the US stock 
market crash of 1987, the Mexican peso crisis of 1994, Asian currency crisis of 1997, Russian 
and LTCM
2
 crises of 1998, Brazilian crisis of 1999 and Turkish 2000/2001 crisis have 
unfortunately not been fully examined in all emerging equity markets. The recent financial 
crisis has provided a golden opportunity for such an investigation.  
Natural disasters have inflicted serious damages on human life, property and economy 
(Asongu, 2012b). Though many earthquakes occur worldwide on a yearly basis and impact all 
walks of life in one way or the other, collateral effects resulting from such natural disasters 
could be quite detrimental financially and economically. The recent Japanese earthquake has 
resulted in collateral damages that make the disaster particularly significant. On March 11, 
2011, Tohoku in Japan was hit by a 9.0 magnitude undersea mega thrust earthquake. This 
powerful shock triggered a tsunami that struck coastlines across the east of the country, 
leaving thousands dead and inflicting considerable property damages. But what has startled 
analysts and left them very concerned over the consequences of this earthquake is the nuclear 
disaster resulting there-from. Classified as a level-seven event on the International Nuclear 
Event Scale, the Fukushima nuclear incident has posed a risk equal to the worst nuclear power 
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plant accident in history (Chernobyl disaster). With much uncertainty over how the crisis 
would have been managed, it is imperative to investigate how international financial markets 
reacted three months into the crises. Therefore, the second goal of this chapter is to examine 
whether any contagion effect occurred a few months after the Japanese earthquake, tsunami 
and worst nuclear crisis since Chernobyl.  
 There are many reasons this chapter should be dedicated to studying the extent to 
which financial markets have been affected by the recent financial and natural crises. Among 
others, results of the studies could enable analysts and policy makers evaluate the benefits of 
international trade and cross-border investments, and hence, the attractiveness of foreign 
capital inflows. The results could also provide some basis on how developing countries stand 
to benefit (loss) from (in) long-run investment sources and global financial booms (as a result 
of external financial shocks) through financial market integration. The rest of the chapter is 
organized as follows. Section 2 examine related literature with emphasis on the effects of 
financial market integration, linkages between financial market integration and crises, 
definitions and channels of contagion and, how to measure contagion. Section 3 provides 
evidence of contagion from the 2007 global financial crisis in financial markets of developing 
countries. In Section 4, global international stock indices and exchange rates are investigated 
for contagion after the 2011 Japanese tsunami, earthquake and nuclear crises. We conclude 
with Section 5.   
 
2. Related literature 
2.1 Effects of financial market integration 
 Financial integration between economies is believed to have two main positive 
impacts: the improvement of capital allocation efficiency and diversification of risks 
(Demyanyk and Volosovych, 2008; Coulibaly, 2009; Kose et al., 2011; Asongu, 2012ab). 
However, the recent global financial crisis which is considered by many analysts and 
policymakers as the worst since the Great Depression has cast a dark shadow on the contagion 
effect of financial integration; despite its advantages. There is a broad economics and finance 
literature that addresses the potential benefits of financial integration.  
 From a theoretical perspective, financial globalization should facilitate efficient 
international allocation of capital and improve international risks sharing (Kose et al., 2011; 
Asongu, 2012a). Asongu (2012a) posit that, the benefits are much greater for developing 
countries because they are relatively scarce in capital and rich in labor sources. Accordingly, 
access to foreign capital should help them grow faster through new sources of investment. He 
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has further professed that, since developing countries have more volatile output growth than 
advanced industrial economies, their potential welfare gains from international risk sharing 
are much greater. The findings of Kose et al. (2011) reveal that, with certain identifiable 
thresholds in variables such as financial depth and institutional quality, the cost-benefit trade-
off from financial openness improves significantly once the threshold conditions are met. 
Demyanyk and Volosovych (2008) much earlier had analyzed the benefits of financial 
integration (resulting from international risk sharing) among 25 European Union (EU) 
countries and presented a case for diversification of risk across EU member states if the risks 
are fully shared. In a nutshell they emphasized that; the 10 new members joining the EU 
would have higher gains than the long standing 15 members. The most glaring indication of 
financial integration benefits is the case of South Africa, a country that has experienced 
financial autarky as a result of the embargo imposed in 1985 and removed in 1993. Consistent 
with Coulibaly (2009), there was a significant decrease in the rates of investment, capital and 
output during the embargo period in South Africa in comparison with the pre-embargo and 
post-embargo periods.    
   During the embargo South Africa might have benefited from financial isolation in 
event of a global financial meltdown. This implies, countries in relative financial autarky are 
less vulnerable to international financial shocks. Though one of the main appeals of financial 
integration is risk diversification, paradoxically, increased financial globalization can reduce 
the scope for risk diversification because integrated markets tend to be more interdependent 
and highly correlated. Another downside of financial integration could be linked to threshold 
factors pointed-out earlier by Kose et al. (2011). Their study has revealed that, countries with 
low levels of financial depth and institutional quality do not stand to benefit from financial 
integration. This perspective is in line with Schmukler (2004) who had stressed that: the 
importance of sound financial fundamentals and strong macroeconomic institutions; the 
presence of which should enable more effective management of crises and lower the 
probability of crises and contagion. Hence, financial globalization could itself be a source of 
crises.  
 
2.2 Linkages between financial integration (globalization) and crises 
 We have observed that financial globalization has several potential benefits. However 
the recent stream of financial crises and contagion due to the growing liberalization of 
financial systems and integration of financial markets around the world, have led many 
analysts to conclude that globalization breeds financial volatility and crises (Asongu, 2012ab). 
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Though domestic factors are usually at the origin of crises, there are different channels 
through which financial globalization could be related to crises. 
 Firstly, as emphasized by Schmukler (2004), when a country’s financial system is 
liberalized, it becomes an object of market discipline exercised by both foreign and domestic 
investors. In a closed economy, only domestic investors monitor and react to unsound 
economic fundamentals while, in an open one domestic and foreign investors might prompt 
the country to achieve sound fundamentals. As pointed-out earlier, the absence of sound 
macroeconomic, financial and institutional fundamentals could substantially increase the 
probability of crises. It logically follows that, conflicting interests and views between 
investors (domestic and foreign) on key fundamentals might precipitate crises and reduce the 
ability of governments to effectively monitor and manage them.   
 Secondly, even with sound domestic economic fundamentals and quality institutions, 
international financial market imperfections could also lead to crises. Among other things, 
these could lead to irrational behavior, herding behavior, speculative attacks, bubbles, and 
crashes. In plainer terms, regardless of market fundamentals, investors could speculate against 
a currency if they believe that the exchange rate is unsustainable, which could ultimately lead 
to self-fulfilling balance-of-payments. This thesis illustrated by Obstfeld (1986) has been 
purported by Schmukler (2004), amongst others.  
 Thirdly, even in the presence of sound fundamentals and absence of imperfections in 
international capital markets, crises might still arise on the grounds of external factors 
(Schmukler, 2004) such as determinants of capital flows (Calvo et al., 1996) and foreign 
interest rates (Frankel and Rose, 1996). For example if a country becomes dependent on 
foreign capital, variations in foreign capital flows could create financial issues and economic 
downturns. Frankel and Rose (1996) clearly emphasize the role foreign interest rates play in 
determining the likelihood of financial crises in developing countries.     
 Fourthly, still consistent with Schmukler (2004), financial globalization could lead to 
financial crises by contagion, namely by shocks via real links, financial links and herding-
behavior or unexplained high correlations. This chapter will focus on this fourth example
3
; the 
elucidation and definition of which are worthwhile.    
 
2.3 Definitions and channels of contagion 
2.3.1 Definitions of contagion 
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There is no consensus on the definition of contagion among economists. According to 
the World Bank, the phenomenon can be defined from three angles. Firstly, from a broad 
angle, contagion could be identified with the general process of stock transmission across 
countries. Thus, it is worthwhile understanding that this definition does encompass both 
negative shocks and positive spillover effects.  Secondly, the phenomenon could be conceived 
as the propagation of shocks between two countries in excess of what should be expected, 
based on the fundamentals after considering co-movements triggered by common shocks. 
This second definition is restricted only to shocks and presupposes the mastery of what 
constitutes the underlying fundamentals (without which an appraisal of excess co-movements 
is not possible). The last and more restrictive definition considers the phenomenon as the 
change in the transmission mechanisms (channels) that take place during a period of turmoil 
and is appreciated by a significant increase in cross-market correlations. Within the 
framework of this chapter, we shall be restricted to the third definition because: (1) our 
studies aim to investigate recent trends in some crises of global dimension which are negative 
shocks and not positive spillovers (as opposed to the first definition) and; (2) we do not 
master what constitutes underlying fundamentals of co-movements we are about to study (in 
antagonism to the second definition).  
 From an empirical standpoint, the third definition was first proposed by Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002). They assessed contagion as a significant increase in market co-movements 
after a shock has occurred in one country (or market). According to this definition, the 
condition for contagion is a significant increase in co-movements as a result of a shock in one 
market. Accordingly, if two markets display a high degree of co-movements during the 
stability period, even if they are highly correlated during a crisis, if this crisis-correlation is 
not significant it does not amount to contagion. In the absence of a significant correlation 
during the crisis-period, the term ‘interdependence’ is used to qualify the situation between 
the two markets (or countries).   
 
 
2.3.2 Channels of contagion 
 Borrowing from Schmukler (2004), three mains channels of contagion have been 
documented in the literature. (1) Firstly, real links which are often associated with trading 
activities. For example if two countries are trading partners and compete in the same external 
market, a devaluation of the exchange rate of one country deteriorates the other country’s 
competitive advantage. In order to rebalance its external sectors, the losing country would 
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want to devaluate its own currency. The Sino-American trade relation today is an eloquent 
example. (2) Secondly, a financial link is a situation where two economies are connected 
through the international financial system. For instance, let us consider leverage institutions 
facing margin calls. In case the value of the collateral falls as a result of a negative shock in 
one country, in a bid to increase their initial stock,   these institutions would sell some of their 
holdings in countries not yet affected by the shock. This gives rise to a mechanism that ripples 
the shocks to other countries. (3) Thirdly, due to herding behaviors or panics resulting from 
asymmetric information, financial markets might transmit shocks across markets. For obvious 
reasons (common sense), we shall not elaborate on the mechanics of this third type. 
 
 
2.4 Measuring contagion  
Many methods of measuring contagion have been documented in the literature to 
appreciate the spreading of international shocks across countries. The most widely employed 
are cross-market correlation coefficients procedures (King and Wadhwani, 1990; Forbes and 
Rigobon, 2002; Collins and Biekpe, 2003; Lee et al., 2007; Asongu, 2011; Asongu, 2012ab), 
cross-market co-integration vectors changing techniques (Kanas, 1998), volatility analysis 
based on ARCH and GARCH models (King et al., 1994) and direct estimation of specific 
transmission mechanisms (Forbes, 2000). Consistent with the restrictive definition of 
contagion, the chapter shall adopt Forbes and Rigobon (2002) in the context of: (1) Collins 
and Biekpe (2003)
4
 for the assessment of financial (Section 3) and political (Section 5) crises 
and; (2) Lee et al. (2007) for the examination of natural disasters (Section 4).  
 
3. The 2007 financial crisis  
Financial integration among economies has the benefit of improving allocation 
efficiency and diversifying risk. However the recent global financial crisis, considered as the 
worst since the Great Depression has re-ignited the fierce debate about the merits of financial 
globalization and its implications for growth especially in developing countries (Asongu, 
2012a). This section examines whether equity markets in emerging countries were vulnerable 
to contagion during the recent global financial meltdown.  
 
3.1 Data 
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test statistics (Collins and Biekpe, 2003) uses exact student statistics based on actual sample correlation 
coefficients (Asongu, 2012a). Contagion is then measured by the significant increase in adjusted correlation 
coefficients during the crisis period as compared with the stable period.  
 9 
 The purpose of this study is to investigate correlations between the returns of the USA 
stock index and stock indices of emerging countries. With the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
as the ‘base criterion’, we analyze if co-movements between the ‘base criterion’ and financial 
markets of developing countries were significantly strengthened during the recent global 
financial crisis. In et al. (2008), MacAndrews (2008), Taylor and William (2008) and more 
recently Ji and In (2010) have all used the August 9
th
 2007 date as the start of the financial 
crisis
5
.   The sample period is divided into two categories: a 14 month pre-crisis period also 
known as the tranquil or stable period and, a 15 month crisis or turmoil period. In a bid to 
make our findings robust, the turmoil period is further divided into three sections
6
: the short-
run or four month crisis-period (August 09, 2007 to December 06, 2007); the medium-term or 
eight months crisis-period (August 09, 2007 to April 10, 2008) and the long-term or 15 month 
crisis-period (August 09, 2007 to November 13, 2008). Weekly data used in the study is 
obtained from Bloomberg’s database. We use the local currency index return because Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002) have shown that using dollar or local indices will produce similar 
outcomes.       
 
3.2 Methodology  
 Contagion is defined by Forbes and Rigobon as a significant increase in market co-
movements after a shock has occurred in one country
7
.  
 The correlation coefficient is defined as:   
yx
xy


                                                                                                    (1) 
where: ‘x’ is the base criterion while ‘y’ is an emerging equity market.  
Consistent with Forbes and Rigobon, the correlation coefficient is adjusted in the following 
manner: 
])(1[1
*
2



                                                                                  (2) 
Where: 
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‘interdependence’ is used to qualify to relationship. 
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  which measures the change in high-period volatility against low-period volatility. The crisis-
period is used as the ‘high volatility period’ and the tranquil period as the ‘low volatility 
period’ in the calculation of the correlation coefficient adjuster. Contagion is subsequently 
measured as the significance of adjusted correlation coefficients in time-varying turmoil 
periods versus the stability period.  
In the empirical literature, Collins and Biekpe (2003) and Lee et al. (2007) have 
respectively applied both the t-test and F-test for the significance of the difference in 
correlations. Accordingly, when only one coefficient is to be estimated, both tests have the 
same implications (Asongu, 2011; Asongu, 2012ab). Consistent with the t-statistics approach, 
the significance of increase in correlations during the turmoil period (t) with respect to the 
stable(s) period is defined by: 
2)(1
4
)(
st
st
st
nn
t




                          (3) 
Where 
)4,01.0(  st nn
t  
with, nt (ns) indicating actual observed weeks during the turmoil (stable) period. 
The following hypotheses are then tested: 
0: 21  oH  versus 0: 211  H  
Where oH  is the null hypothesis of no contagion while 1H  is the alternative hypothesis for 
the presence of contagion 
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Table1: International stock indexes returns conditional (unadjusted) correlation coefficient s in 2007 financial crisis 
Regions Countries Full period Stable period Short-term turmoil period Medium-term turmoil period Long-term turmoil period  
  ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ t-test Co ρ σ t-test Co ρ σ t-test Co 
                  
 
 
 
 
Africa 
Botswana -0.040 0.015 0.024 0.014 0.573 0.010 5.641*** Y 0.197 0.008 1.675* Y -0.188 0.013 -2.419** N 
Egypt 0.336 0.045 0.196 0.034 0.419 0.028 1.968* Y 0.212 0.028 0.154 N 0.353 0.051 1.757* Y 
Kenya 0.083 0.034 0.008 0.028 0.049 0.030 0.494 N -0.178 0.038 -1.656 N 0.079 0.038 0.970 N 
Mauritius 0.302 0.030 0.003 0.028 0.001 0.024 0.039 N -0.099 0.027 -0.922 N 0.382 0.031 4.636*** Y 
Morocco 0.059 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.022 0.019 -0.014 N -0.109 0.019 -1.288 N 0.051 0.021 0.294 N 
Namibia 0.376 0.037 0.417 0.024 0.558 0.034 1.219 N 0.111 0.043 -3.093*** N 0.342 0.045 -0.845 N 
Nigeria 0.027 0.038 0.095 0.032 -0.457 0.027 -5.710*** N -0.410 0.026 -5.617*** N -0.060 0.040 -1.743* N 
South A 0.435 0.030 0.380 0.021 0.674 0.024 2.641** Y 0.238 0.031 -1.378 N 0.428 0.036 0.522 N 
Tunisia 0.258 0.016 0.129 0.014 0.183 0.009 0.462 N 0.165 0.018 0.343 N 0.341 0.018 2.405** Y 
                  
 
 
 
Middle 
East 
A Dhabi -0.069 0.030 -0.053 0.021 0.246 0.024 2.706*** Y -0.133 0.025 -0.761 N -0.086 0.037 -0.356 N 
Bahrain 0.017 0.015 -0.031 0.013 0.477 0.013 5.069*** Y 0.173 0.012 1.998** Y -0.004 0.017 0.297 N 
Dubai -0.085 0.039 -0.027 0.027 -0.160 0.031 -1.146 N -0.173 0.030 -1.410 N -0.126 0.048 -1.089 N 
Israel 0.264 0.028 0.531 0.023 0.697 0.019 1.444 N 0.287 0.025 -2.411** N 0.089 0.032 -5.462*** N 
Jordan 0.015 0.031 0.044 0.020 0.148 0.016 0.893 N 0.034 0.020 -0.105 N 0.011 0.040 -0.381 N 
Kuwait -0.085 0.026 n.a n.a 0.681 0.014 n.a  0.106 0.013 n.a  -0.085 0.026 n.a  
Lebanon 0.200 0.033 0.226 0.023 0.145 0.023 -0.710 N 0.181 0.021 -0.441 N 0.213 0.040 -0.155 N 
Oman -0.217 0.031 0.112 0.016 0.013 0.019 -0.865 N -0.261 0.028 -3.867*** N -0.306 0.040 -5.112*** N 
Qatar -0.133 0.040 -0.032 0.030 0.186 0.027 1.930* Y -0.101 0.037 -0.653 N -0.175 0.047 -1.595 N 
Saudi A 0.012 0.047 0.059 0.041 -0.302 0.027 -3.339*** N -0.113 0.053 -1.681* N -0.002 0.052 0.522 N 
                  
 
 
 
 
 
Asia 
China 0.073 0.056 0.071 0.048 0.528 0.045 4.507*** Y 0.071 0.048 0.064 N 0.063 0.012 -0.582 N 
Dhaka 0.047 0.024 -0.275 0.020 -0.462 0.022 -6.698*** N -0.275 0.020 -4.539*** N -0.132 0.020 -3.289*** Y 
India 0.264 0.038 0.252 0.044 0.400 0.042 0.574 N 0.252 0.044 -0.778 N 0.212 0.048 -1.355 N 
Indonesia 0.057 0.040 0.394 0.054 0.773 0.055 5.268*** Y 0.394 0.054 1.389 N -0.031 0.052 -3.263*** N 
Malaysia 0.100 0.026 0.457 0.036 0.838 0.034 6.045*** Y 0.457 0.036 1.903* Y 0.015 0.031 -2.832*** N 
Mongolia 0.062 0.046 -0.093 0.044 -0.175 0.056 0.665 N -0.093 0.044 1.538 N 0.049 0.038 3.499*** Y 
Pakistan 0.021 0.037 0.330 0.028 0.338 0.033 2.584** Y 0.330 0.028 2.798*** Y -0.031 0.042 -0.898 N 
Philippines 0.361 0.040 0.621 0.045 0.855 0.053 7.127*** Y 0.621 0.045 4.229*** Y 0.373 0.048 1.749* Y 
S. Korea 0.469 0.034 0.640 0.041 0.822 0.047 10.324*** Y 0.640 0.041 6.945*** Y 0.502 0.042 5.562*** Y 
Sri Lanka 0.204 0.027 0.380 0.019 -0.100 0.021 -0.828 N 0.380 0.019 3.997*** Y 0.288 0.027 3.390*** Y 
Taiwan 0.429 0.035 0.415 0.040 0.836 0.041 18.401*** Y 0.415 0.040 5.315*** Y 0.482 0.043 7.331*** Y 
Thailand 0.355 0.037 0.422 0.039 0.715 0.035 5.908*** Y 0.422 0.039 2.722*** Y 0.385 0.046 2.698*** Y 
Vietnam 0.204 0.060 0.319 0.056 0.524 0.032 3.842*** Y 0.319 0.056 1.985* Y 0.195 0.068 0.876 N 
                   
 
 
 
Latin 
America 
Argentina 0.543 0.041 0.644 0.026 0.752 0.045 0.934 N 0.630 0.037 -0.136 N 0.505 0.051 -1.556 N 
Brazil 0.773 0.043 0.797 0.027 0.831 0.043 0.290 N 0.720 0.042 -0.744 N 0.765 0.052 -0.358 N 
Chile 0.690 0.034 0.588 0.020 0.721 0.040 1.154 N 0.710 0.040 1.178 N 0.703 0.043 1.281 N 
Columbia 0.475 0.032 0.336 0.026 0.381 0.030 0.386 N 0.616 0.034 2.802*** Y 0.504 0.036 1.896* Y 
Costa Rica -0.020 0.028 -0.085 0.031 -0.088 0.019 -0.025 N -0.203 0.023 -1.140 N -0.083 0.021 0.023 N 
Ecuador 0.030 0.029 0.085 0.015 0.010 0.005 -0.648 N 0.040 0.049 -0.431 N 0.016 0.037 -0.773 N 
Mexico 0.774 0.037 0.721 0.026 0.814 0.037 0.800 N 0.865 0.037 1.391 N 0.784 0.044 0.692 N 
Peru 0.422 0.052 -0.066 0.029 0.907 0.063 35.962*** Y 0.693 0.059 11.16*** Y 0.478 0.065 7.185*** Y 
Venezuela 0.119 0.034 0.035 0.038 0.193 0.027 1.379 N 0.269 0.034 2.313** Y 0.159 0.030 1.385 N 
The table shows the conditional (unadjusted) cross market correlation coefficients (ρ) and standard deviations for the US and other stock markets. Test statistics is obtained from t-transformations. The stable period is 
defined as the 14-month pre-crisis period (June 08, 2006 to August 09, 2007). The short-term turmoil period is defined as the four-month crisis period (August 09, 2007 to December 06, 2007). The medium-term 
turmoil period is defined as the eight months crisis period (August 09, 2007 to April 10, 2008). The long-term turmoil period is defined the fifteen months crisis period (August 09, 2007 to November 13, 2008). The full 
period is the stable period plus the long-term turmoil period (June 08, 2006 to November 13, 2008). Contagion (Co) occurs (Y)when the test statistics is greater than the critical values. No contagion (N) occurs when the 
test statistics is less than or equal to the critical value.*, **, ***: represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. (nt+ns-4) degrees of freedom for the t-statistics are (66+61-4); (35+61-4);(17+61-4) for the long, 
medium and short terms respectively. σ: represents the standard deviation.  
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Table 2: International stock indexes returns unconditional (adjusted) correlation coefficient   in 2007 financial crisis 
Regions Countries Full period Stable period Short-term turmoil period Medium-term turmoil period Long-term turmoil period  
  ρ σ ρ*stp ρ*mtp ρ*ltp ρ* δ t-test Co ρ* δ t-test Co ρ* δ t-test Co 
                   
 
 
 
Africa 
Botswana -0.040 0.015 0.030 0.034 0.026 0.647 -0.321 6.747*** Y 0.265 -0.466 2.278** Y -0.197 -0.090 -2.538** N 
Egypt 0.336 0.045 0.219 0.217 0.163 0.459 -0.202 2.133** Y 0.234 -0.189 0.168 N 0.296 0.475 1.498 N 
Kenya 0.083 0.034 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 0.048 0.062 0.479 N -0.155 0.339 -1.432 N 0.069 0.317 0.845 N 
Mauritius 0.302 0.030 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.163 0.043 N -0.102 -0.057 -0.949 N 0.373 0.060 4.502*** Y 
Morocco 0.059 0.024 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.026 -0.250 -0.016 N -0.126 -0.250 -1.489 N 0.055 -0.160 0.320 N 
Namibia 0.376 0.037 0.366 0.329 0.323 0.499 0.362 1.152 N 0.084 0.745 -2.419** N 0.261 0.809 -0.694 N 
Nigeria 0.027 0.038 0.105 0.106 0.086 -0.492 -0.171 -6.40*** N -0.448 -0.195 -6.38*** N -0.054 0.225 -1.573 N 
South A 0.435 0.030 0.358 0.321 0.302 0.648 0.151 2.604** Y 0.198 0.471 -1.188 N 0.342 0.688 0.446 N 
Tunisia 0.258 0.016 0.166 0.117 0.117 0.233 -0.399 0.582 N 0.150 0.221 0.312 N 0.311 0.228 2.198** Y 
                   
 
 
 
 
Middle 
East 
A Dhabi -0.069 0.030 -0.051 -0.050 -0.041 0.235 0.107 2.566** Y -0.124 0.145 -0.713 N -0.066 0.686 -0.275 N 
Bahrain 0.017 0.015 -0.032 -0.033 -0.028 0.483 -0.033 5.160*** Y 0.181 -0.089 2.095** Y -0.004 0.235 0.268 N 
Dubai -0.085 0.039 -0.027 -0.166 -0.021 -0.152 0.110 -1.089 N -0.166 0.094 -0.002 N -0.096 0.727 -0.830 N 
Israel 0.264 0.028 0.569 0.522 0.477 0.731 -0.180 1.414 N 0.281 0.052 -2.380** N 0.077 0.338 -4.829 Y 
Jordan 0.015 0.031 0.050 0.045 0.032 0.166 -0.204 0.998 N 0.034 -0.017 -0.106 N 0.007 1.009 -0.269 N 
Kuwait -0.085 0.026 n.a -0.007 n.a n.a n.a n.a  n.a n.a n.a  n.a n.a n.a  
Lebanon 0.200 0.033 0.233 0.239 0.178 0.148 -0.051 -0.727 N 0.191 -0.106 -0.463 N 0.167 0.653 -0.124 N 
Oman -0.217 0.031 0.104 0.087 0.072 0.012 0.181 -0.796 N -0.204 0.680 -2.92*** N -0.201 1.453 -3.14*** N 
Qatar -0.133 0.040 -0.035 -0.030 -0.026 0.198 -0.123 2.063** Y -0.092 0.196 -0.598 N -0.142 0.540 -1.289 N 
Saudi A 0.012 0.047 0.074 0.052 0.053 -0.366 -0.351 -4.21*** N -0.099 0.294 -1.474 N -0.002 0.267 -0.606 N 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asia 
China 0.073 0.056 0.058 0.059 0.052 0.488 0.112 4.108*** Y 0.065 0.165 0.060 N 0.009 0.533 -0.470 N 
Dhaka 0.047 0.024 0.178 0.173 0.171 -0.510 -0.121 -8.05*** N -0.309 -0.224 -5.27*** N -0.148 -0.210 -3.732 Y 
India 0.264 0.038 0.223 0.266 0.256 0.272 0.559 0.426 N 0.200 0.637 -0.639 N 0.161 0.773 -1.067 N 
Indonesia 0.057 0.040 0.107 0.165 0.169 0.490 1.441 3.566*** Y 0.267 1.392 0.983 N -0.021 1.287 -2.142** N 
Malaysia 0.100 0.026 0.152 0.195 0.208 0.679 0.780 5.338*** Y 0.352 0.872 1.521 N 0.012 0.632 2.222** Y 
Mongolia 0.062 0.046 -0.203 -0.253 -0.270 -0.140 0.258 0.543 N -0.094 -0.009 1.544 N 0.053 -0.138 3.782*** Y 
Pakistan 0.021 0.037 0.047 0.052 0.043 0.318 0.072 2.420** Y 0.342 -0.077 2.906*** Y -0.026 0.382 -0.764 N 
Philippines 0.361 0.040 0.122 0.176 0.171 0.701 0.817 6.113*** Y 0.537 0.545 3.712*** Y 0.299 0.650 1.432 N 
S. Korea 0.469 0.034 0.020 0.035 0.034 0.527 1.724 5.060*** Y 0.477 1.348 4.734*** Y 0.350 1.410 3.687*** Y 
Sri Lanka 0.204 0.027 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.127 -0.216 -1.056 N 0.434 -0.271 4.687*** Y 0.286 0.017 3.362*** Y 
Taiwan 0.429 0.035 -0.034 -0.050 -0.048 0.639 1.028 7.839*** Y 0.311 0.945 3.711*** Y 0.355 1.105 4.876*** Y 
Thailand 0.355 0.037 0.109 0.121 0.111 0.605 0.374 4.908*** Y 0.353 0.527 2.282** Y 0.296 0.815 2.087** Y 
Vietnam 0.204 0.060 0.172 0.109 0.098 0.687 -0.327 5.169*** Y 0.299 0.155 1.862* Y 0.165 0.416 0.744 N 
                   
 
 
 
Latin  
America 
Argentina 0.543 0.041 0.538 0.579 0.410 0.654 0.746 1.006 N 0.565 0.407 -0.139 N 0.293 0.976 -1.312 N 
Brazil 0.773 0.043 0.724 0.728 0.601 0.765 0.586 0.352 N 0.640 0.550 -0.843 N 0.557 0.900 -0.482 N 
Chile 0.690 0.034 0.453 0.454 0.326 0.589 1.044 1.174 N 0.577 1.035 1.189 N 0.434 1.228 1.198 N 
Columbia 0.475 0.032 0.316 0.300 0.252 0.359 0.142 0.370 N 0.567 0.289 2.665*** Y 0.394 0.377 1.591 N 
Costa Rica -0.020 0.028 -0.108 -0.097 -0.123 -0.111 -0.376 -0.031 N -0.231 -0.235 -1.294 N -0.120 -0.309 0.033 N 
Ecuador 0.030 0.029 0.145 0.047 0.034 0.017 -0.659 -1.106 N 0.022 2.360 -0.236 N 0.006 1.517 -0.308 N 
Mexico 0.774 0.037 0.657 0.655 0.537 0.761 0.430 0.898 N 0.820 0.442 1.607 N 0.614 0.715 0.857 N 
Peru 0.422 0.052 -0.045 -0.046 -0.029 0.824 1.184 15.092*** Y 0.555 1.072 7.210*** Y 0.242 1.268 3.117*** Y 
Venezuela 0.119 0.034 0.042 0.037 0.044 0.229 -0.301 1.642 N 0.285 -0.114 2.452** Y 0.201 -0.216 1.760* Y 
The table shows the unconditional (adjusted) cross market correlation coefficients (ρ) and standard deviations for the US and other stock markets. Test statistics is obtained from t-transformations. The stable period is 
defined as the 14-month pre-crisis period (June 08, 2006 to August 09, 2007). The short-term turmoil period is defined as the four-month crisis period (August 09, 2007 to December 06, 2007). The medium-term 
turmoil period is defined as the eight months crisis period (August 09, 2007 to April 10, 2008). The long-term turmoil period is defined the fifteen months crisis period (August 09, 2007 to November 13, 2008). The full 
period is the stable period plus the long-term turmoil period (June 08, 2006 to November 13, 2008). Contagion (Co) occurs (Y) when the test statistics is greater than the critical values. No contagion (N) occurs when 
the test statistics is less than or equal to the critical value.*, **, ***: represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. (nt+ns-4) degrees of freedom for the t-statistics are (66+61-4); (35+61-4);(17+61-4) for the 
long, medium and short terms respectively. σ: represents  the standard deviation. ρ*stp, ρ*mtp, ρ*ltp denote adjusted correlation coefficients for the short, medium and long term periods respectively. δ: correlation 
coefficient adjuster.  
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3.3 Presentation of results and discussion  
As shown in Tables 1-2, contagion results based on significant shifts in conditional 
(unadjusted) correlation coefficients are robust to adjusted (unconditional) correlations. 
Broadly, the following effects of the financial crisis could be observed: (1) with the 
exceptions of India and Dhaka, Asian markets were worst hit; (2) but for Peru, Venezuela and 
Columbia, Latin American countries were least affected and; (3) Africa and Middle East 
emerging markets were averagely contaminated with the exceptions of Kenya, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Morocco, Dubai, Jordan, Israel, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon.  
 The quasi-immunity of Latin American countries to this recent global financial 
meltdown was not unexpected. Given its relative important history in the management of 
financial crises, the continent was the most prepared. Current trends show that, Latin America 
has improved since the Russian crisis, which has given countries in the continent some leeway 
(particularly in monetary policy) to implement measures that attenuate the effect of crises. 
Latin America and the Caribbean countries have built-up to 400 billion dollars in international 
reserves and have substantially reduced their dollar-denominated debt (especially within the 
banking system). For example, lower levels of debt dollarization has allowed Brazil to loosen 
monetary policy in the face of the credit crunch in ways that many countries could not in the 
post Russian crisis era. In the wake of the financial crisis, Latin American countries swiftly 
depreciated their currencies without getting into the turmoil.  From a fiscal standpoint, many 
of these countries have saved a considerable amount of their tax income on extra revenue 
from commodity bonanza at the turn of the century. For instance, Chile has spent only 34% 
and kept the rest of increased tax collected in a special fund. Hence, even if the crisis had 
affected these countries, they would still have had the leeway of increasing spending while 
lowering taxes, in order to easily recover from recession.   
 Results from Africa were not entirely unexpected. With the exceptions of Kenya, 
Namibia, Nigeria and Morocco, African stock markets are contaminated in at least one time 
horizon. This reflects the increasing connection between African markets with global capital 
flows. Accordingly, African markets are growing in size, liquidity and degree of foreign 
participation. However misleading it may be to equate contagion to integration, a logical 
extension of the results could make a case for African equity markets global integration. 
 Turning to the Middle East, but for Israel, Oman and Saudi Arabia, oil exporting 
countries (Bahrain and Qatar) have been contaminated while, with the exception of Abu 
Dhabi, non-oil producing states (Dubai, Jordan, Lebanon) have remained unaffected. 
Consistent with Anoruo and Mustafa (2007) (on the relation between oil and stock prices, 
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where causality runs from the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) to oil prices and not vice 
versa), the DJIA which is our base criterion in this study negatively affected oil prices  (which 
in-turn has had a toll on  the stock markets of oil exporting countries).  
 Whereas Dhaka and India in Asia have remained uncontaminated, China and 
Mongolia have been affected only in the short- and long-run horizons respectively. Other 
emerging markets have also been affected at least in two time-horizons. The unexpected 
speed and force with which the global financial crisis has affected Asian economies could be 
explained from trade channels. The region currently has deep economic integration with the 
rest of the world, especially developments in the United States. A case in point is the loss in 
export volume growth in Western Asia from 6.4% in 2006 to -0.6% in 2007.  Conversely, the 
fact that India has been broadly unaffected is not unexpected. India has a completely different 
approach to financial globalization. Whereas the Indian current account was fully opened on a 
gradual basis in the 1990s, a more calibrated approach has been followed to the opening of the 
capital account and subsequently the financial sector. This approach is consistent with the 
available weight of empirical evidence on the benefits of capital account liberalization for 
acceleration of economic growth, particularly in emerging economies. Further evidence 
suggests that, the greatest gains are obtained from openness to foreign direct investment 
followed by portfolio investment. Benefits resulting from external debt flows are questionable 
until greater domestic financial market development has taken place (Henry, 2007; Asongu, 
2012c). As a policy implication, policy making bodies should reconsider Latin American 
monetary and fiscal strategies in the fight against external financial shocks. Also, the validity 
of India’s financial liberalization strategy could serve as a guide for governments in other 
developing countries
8
. 
 
4. The 2011 Japanese earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crises 
Natural disasters may inflict significant damage upon international financial markets. 
The purpose of this section is to investigate if any contagion effect occurred in the immediate 
aftermath of the Japanese earthquake, tsunami and subsequent nuclear crises.  
 
                                                 
8“Whereas the Indian current account has been opened fully though gradually in the 1990s, a more calibrated 
approach has been followed in the opening of the capital account and subsequently the financial sector. This 
approach is consistent with the weight of available empirical evidence on the benefits of capital account 
liberalization for acceleration of economic growth, particularly in emerging economies. Evidence suggests that 
the greatest gains are obtained from openness to foreign direct investment followed by portfolio investment. 
Benefits resulting from external debt flows are questionable until greater domestic financial market development 
has taken place” (Henry, 2007).  
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4.1 Data 
 To investigate the correlations among returns of the Japanese daily stock index 
(exchange rate) and 33 international stock indices (exchange rates) returns, the Japanese 
equity and foreign exchange markets are the base criteria. Thus, we examine whether co-
movements among national stock and foreign exchange markets increased significantly after 
the major earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disasters. The sample period is divided into two 
sections: the 12-month pre-earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011) and the 2-
month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011)
9
. Whereas the stability 
period is defined as the pre-earthquake period, the turbulent (turmoil) period is the post-
earthquake period. In order to ensure robustness of our findings, the turmoil period is further 
divided into two equal sections: the 1-month (short-term) post-earthquake period (March 11, 
2011 to April 10, 2011) and, the 2-month (medium-term) post-earthquake (March 11, 2011 to 
May 10, 2011). The number of days is respectively 365, 31, 62 days for the stable, short-term 
turmoil and medium-term turmoil periods.  Data used in the study is obtained from 
Bloomberg’s database. In the computing stock returns, last values are carried over for non-
trading days. The US dollar is used as the common “x” unit of foreign currency for each unit 
of national/regional currency in the computation of exchange rate returns. The use of local 
currency index return is consistent with Forbes and Rigobon who have shown that, using 
dollar or local indices will produce similar results. 
  
4.2 Methodology  
 Borrowing from Forbes and Rigobon, contagion is a significant increase in market co-
movements after a shock has occurred in one country.  
 The coefficient of correlation is defined as:   
yx
xy


                                                                                                    (4) 
Where: ‘x’ represents the base criterion and ‘y’ an international market.  This correlation 
coefficient is adjusted in the following manner to take account of heteroscedasticity:  
 
])(1[1
*
2



                                                                                  (5) 
Where: 
 
                                                 
9
 Differences in pre-earthquake and post-earthquake sample periods are in line with Collins and Biekpe (2003); 
Lee et al. (2007) and Asongu (2011, 2012a).  
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It measures the change in high-period volatility against volatility in the low-period. Whereas 
the crisis interval is used as the high volatility period, the tranquil (or stable-period) represents 
the low volatility period. Contagion is accordingly measured as the significant increase of 
adjusted correlation coefficients in time-varying turmoil periods against the stability period.   
 Consistent with Lee et al. (2007), the following hypotheses are tested:  
0:  stoH   versus 0:1  stH   
Where, ρt is the adjusted correlation coefficient during the turmoil period and ρs the adjusted 
correlation coefficient for the stable period. A comparison of the variation in correlation 
between the stable and crisis periods is then analyzed. The null hypothesis (H0) is the 
hypothesis of no contagion whereas H1 is the alternative hypothesis for the presence of 
contagion.  Fisher’s Z transformations of correlation coefficients are employed to test pair-
wise cross-country significance.  The Fisher’s Z-transformations change standard coefficients 
to normally distributed Z variables. Therefore, prior to hypothesis testing, ρ values must be 
converted to Zr values.  
0:  stoH    
⇒ 0:  rsrto ZZH   
0:1  stH    ⇒ 0:1  rsrt ZZH  
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4.3 Empirical results and discussion  
4.3.1 Contagion effect in international stock indexes returns after earthquake  
 Table 3 below shows the conditional (unadjusted) correlation coefficients of 
international stock indices for the 2011 Japanese Tsunami. Cross-market correlations of stock 
index returns are analyzed before and after the earthquake of March 11, 2011. But for China, 
Taiwan, New Zealand, Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and South Africa; cross-
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market correlations between Japan and most countries in the sample during stable period are 
higher than those during medium-term turmoil period. For the short-run interval, correlations 
are strengthened for China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, New Zealand, Argentina, Germany, South 
Korea, Australia, Bahrain, South Africa and Saudi Arabia. There is significant evidence of 
contagion in Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Bahrain and South Africa for the short-term turmoil 
period and only in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia for the medium-term turmoil interval. Relatively 
for the most part, volatilities of most countries during the stable period are higher than those 
during turmoil periods (short and medium terms). Table 4 presents unconditional correlation 
coefficients. These adjusted correlations are higher than their unadjusted counterparts in Table 
3. Ultimately, the findings in Table 3 are robust to those in Table 4.   
 
4.3.2 Contagion effect in international exchange rates returns after earthquake 
 Table 5 presents findings for exchange rate conditional (unadjusted) correlation 
coefficients. Accordingly, cross-market correlations during turmoil periods are higher than 
those during the stable period. Strengthened cross-market correlations with insignificant 
evidence of contagion are noticeable for the Argentine Peso (ARS), Thai Baht (THB), 
Egyptian Pound (EGP), and Qatari Riyal (QAR) for the short-term turmoil period. Looking at 
the medium-term, the Chinese Yuan (RMB), Canadian Dollar (CAD), Egyptian pound (EGP), 
Qatari Riyal (QAR) and Emirati dirham (AED) have also witnessed insignificant stronger co-
movements with the Japanese Yen (JPY).  Adjusted findings in Table 6 confirm those in 
Table 5. Ultimately, no national/regional exchange market is found to have suffered from 
contagion two months in the aftermath of the Japanese earthquake and the ensuing collateral 
disasters. 
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Table 3: International stock indices returns conditional (unadjusted) correlation coefficients in 2011 Japanese earthquake 
 
Regions 
 
Countries 
Full period Stable Period Short-term turmoil period Medium-term turmoil period 
    ρ     σ     ρ     σ     ρ     σ Z-test Co     ρ     σ Z-test Co 
 
South Asia 
and South-
East Asia 
India 0.288 0.009 0.343 0.009 0.247 0.009 -0.538 N 0.171 0.009 -1.321 N 
Malaysia 0.372 0.005 0.405 0.005 0.392 0.005 -0.080 N 0.348 0.005 -0.474 N 
Philippines 0.317 0.009 0.357 0.009 0.295 0.009 -0.353 N 0.266 0.008 -0.715 N 
Singapore n.a 0.000 n.a 0.000 n.a 0.000 n.a n.a n.a 0.000 n.a n.a 
Thailand 0.308 0.009 0.361 0.010 0.278 0.008 -0.470 N 0.209 0.008 -1.180 N 
              
East Asia 
and North-
East Asia 
China 0.283 0.011 0.309 0.012 0.477 0.007 1.022 N 0.321 0.007 0.100 N 
Hong  Kong 0.510 0.009 0.542 0.009 0.574 0.009 0.240 N 0.525 0.008 -0.166 N 
Taiwan 0.587 0.008 0.591 0.008 0.781 0.008 1.881* Y 0.694 0.008 1.247 N 
South Korea 0.575 0.008 0.606 0.008 0.660 0.008 0.458 N 0.566 0.008 -0.437 N 
              
Australasia Australia -0.004 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.073 0.007 0.373 N -0.021 0.007 -0.147 N 
New Zealand 0.440 0.004 0.459 0.004 0.609 0.004 1.080 N 0.515 0.004 0.525 N 
              
North 
America 
Canada -0.055 0.197 -0.013 0.208 -0.441 0.125 -2.348 N -0.343 0.110 -2.455 N 
U.S.A 0.176 0.012 0.217 0.013 0.054 0.008 -0.848 N 0.074 0.007 -1.041 N 
Mexico 0.159 0.007 0.208 0.007 0.048 0.006 -0.831 N 0.027 0.006 -1.310 N 
              
South 
America  
Argentina 0.174 0.012 0.163 0.013 0.312 0.011 0.807 N 0.269 0.010 0.795 N 
Brazil 0.076 0.010 0.120 0.010 -0.033 0.006 -0.783 N -0.069 0.008 -1.351 N 
Chile 0.117 0.007 0.178 0.007 -0.086 0.008 -1.357 N -0.035 0.007 -1.532 N 
              
 
 
Europe 
France 0.321 0.012 0.366 0.012 0.253 0.011 -0.639 N 0.254 0.010 -0.883 N 
Poland 0.218 0.008 0.287 0.008 -0.045 0.006 -1.735 N 0.013 0.006 -2.014 N 
Germany 0.325 0.009 0.366 0.009 0.350 0.012 0.083 N 0.334 0.011 -0.012 N 
Italy 0.248 0.013 0.292 0.013 0.142 0.009 -0.806 N 0.169 0.009 -0.928 N 
Holland 0.332 0.010 0.378 0.010 0.296 0.008 -0.473 N 0.271 0.008 -0.851 N 
Spain 0.193 0.015 0.255 0.016 -0.116 0.009 -1.923 N -0.001 0.009 -1.860 N 
U.K 0.292 0.009 0.361 0.009 0.135 0.008 -1.234 N 0.129 0.008 -1.764 N 
              
 
 
Middle 
East and 
Africa 
Bahrain 0.006 0.005 -0.050 0.005 0.290 0.006 1.774* Y 0.207 0.005 1.850* Y 
Egypt 0.116 0.013 0.104 0.011 0.098 0.028 -0.027 N 0.131 0.022 0.198 N 
Jordan -0.035 0.005 -0.020 0.005 -0.101 0.006 -0.413 N -0.097 0.005 -0.554 N 
Kuwait -0.073 0.005 -0.026 0.005 -0.298 0.006 -1.431 N -0.256 0.004 -1.679 N 
Qatar  0.019 0.009 0.046 0.009 -0.080 0.009 -0.641 N -0.064 0.008 -0.785 N 
Saudi Arabia 0.182 0.011 0.117 0.011 0.493 0.013 2.154** Y 0.457 0.010 2.678*** Y 
UAE 0.080 0.006 0.109 0.006 -0.055 0.006 -0.836 N 0.010 0.005 -0.706 N 
South  Africa 0.348 0.009 0.343 0.009 0.634 0.008 1.994** Y 0.434 0.009 0.766 N 
              
Other Russia 0.290 0.012 0.378 0.012 0.007 0.010 -1.992 N 0.069 0.012 -2.338 N 
Note 1: *, **, ***: statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Note 2: The table shows conditional (unadjusted) cross-market correlation coefficients (ρ) and standard deviations (σ) for Japan and other stock indexes. The test statistics are obtained from Fisher Z transformations. 
The stable period is defined as the 12-month pre-earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011). The short-term turmoil period is defined as the 1-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to April 10, 
2011). The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the 2-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011). The full period is the stable period plus the medium-term turmoil period. Co: contagion 
.While “Y” denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, “N” indicates that the test statistics was less or equal to the critical value and no contagion occurred.  
Note 3: Correlation coefficients are unadjusted for heteroscedasticity.  
 19 
 
Table 4: International stock indices returns unconditional (adjusted) correlation coefficients in 2011 Japanese earthquake 
 
Regions 
 
Countries 
Full period Stable Period Short-term turmoil period Medium-term turmoil period 
      ρ     σ     ρ*stp   ρ*mtp       ρ*     δ Z-test Co       ρ*     δ Z-test Co 
 
South Asia 
and South-
East Asia 
India 0.288 0.009 0.430 0.445 0.315 -0.017 -0.679 N 0.229 0.032 -1.745 N 
Malaysia 0.372 0.005 0.500 0.516 0.485 -0.077 -0.099 N 0.451 -0.111 -0.609 N 
Philippines 0.317 0.009 0.445 0.460 0.373 0.007 -0.443 N 0.351 -0.143 -0.933 N 
Singapore n.a 0.000 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Thailand 0.308 0.009 0.450 0.465 0.352 -0.165 -0.591 N 0.279 -0.155 -1.549 N 
              
East Asia 
and North-
East Asia 
China 0.283 0.011 0.389 0.403 0.577 -0.433 1.262 N 0.418 -0.387 0.130 N 
Hong  Kong 0.510 0.009 0.642 0.658 0.674 0.048 0.283 N 0.642 -0.106 -0.203 N 
Taiwan 0.587 0.008 0.690 0.706 0.852 0.047     2.119** Y 0.794 -0.043 1.458 N 
South Korea 0.575 0.008 0.704 0.719 0.753 0.016 0.528 N 0.682 0.092 -0.523 N 
              
Australasia Australia -0.004 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.095 -0.706 0.485 N -0.028 -0.120 -0.199 N 
New Zealand 0.440 0.004 0.558 0.574 0.707 -0.119 1.283 N 0.632 -0.172 0.651 N 
              
North 
America 
Canada -0.055 0.197 -0.017 -0.018 -0.539 -0.401 -2.985 N -0.445 -0.473 -3.277 N 
U.S.A 0.176 0.012 0.278 0.289 0.070 -0.410 -1.096 N 0.100 -0.458 -1.401 N 
Mexico 0.159 0.007 0.267 0.278 0.063 -0.174 -1.074 N 0.037 -0.118 -1.767 N 
              
South 
America  
Argentina 0.174 0.012 0.210 0.219 0.393 -0.139 1.029 N 0.355 -0.198 1.059 N 
Brazil 0.076 0.010 0.155 0.162 -0.043 -0.381 -1.018 N -0.094 -0.228 -1.833 N 
Chile 0.117 0.007 0.229 0.238 -0.112 0.215 -1.761 N -0.048 0.038 -2.073 N 
              
 
 
Europe 
France 0.321 0.012 0.456 0.471 0.322 -0.124 -0.805 N 0.336 -0.188 -1.153 N 
Poland 0.218 0.008 0.364 0.377 -0.058 -0.295 -2.240 N 0.017 -0.295 -2.702 N 
Germany 0.325 0.009 0.421 0.436 0.437 0.255 0.104 N 0.434 0.142 -0.015 N 
Italy 0.248 0.013 0.369 0.383 0.183 -0.314 -1.032 N 0.227 -0.306 -1.232 N 
Holland 0.332 0.010 0.469 0.485 0.374 -0.209 -0.593 N 0.358 -0.242 -1.108 N 
Spain 0.193 0.015 0.324 0.337 -0.151 -0.406 -2.489 N -0.001 -0.443 -2.504 N 
U.K 0.292 0.009 0.450 0.465 0.175 -0.152 -1.571 N 0.175 -0.120 -2.333 N 
              
 
 
Middle 
East and 
Africa 
Bahrain 0.006 0.005 -0.065 -0.067 0.367 0.022     2.290** Y 0.276 -0.156    2.501** Y 
Egypt 0.116 0.013 0.134 0.140 0.127 1.605 -0.036 N 0.177 0.991 0.268 N 
Jordan -0.035 0.005 -0.026 -0.027 -0.131 0.077 -0.537 N -0.132 -0.159 -0.752 N 
Kuwait -0.073 0.005 -0.034 -0.036 -0.376 0.088 -1.841 N -0.339 -0.157 -2.257 N 
Qatar  0.019 0.009 0.059 0.062 -0.104 0.037 -0.834 N -0.087 -0.133 -1.066 N 
Saudi Arabia 0.182 0.011 0.152 0.158 0.594 0.170    2.705*** Y 0.572 -0.111  3.502*** Y 
UAE 0.080 0.006 0.141 0.147 -0.071 0.012 -1.087 N 0.014 -0.085 -0.957 N 
South  Africa 0.348 0.009 0.429 0.444 0.730 -0.136     2.394** Y 0.548 -0.036 0.980 N 
              
Other Russia 0.290 0.012 0.469 0.485 0.009 -0.176 -2.550 N 0.094 -0.006 -3.100 N 
Note 1: *, **, ***: statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Note 2: The table shows conditional (unadjusted) cross-market correlation coefficients (ρ) , adjuster for heteroscedasticity (δ) and standard deviations (σ) for Japan and other stock indexes. The test statistics are obtained 
from Fisher Z transformations. The stable period is defined as the 12-month pre-earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011). The short-term turmoil period is defined as the 1-month post-earthquake period 
(March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011). The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the 2-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011). The full period is the stable period plus the medium-term 
turmoil period. Co: contagion. While “Y” denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, “N” indicates that the test statistics was less or equal to the critical value and no 
contagion occurred. ρ*stp, ρ*mtp,  denote adjusted correlation coefficients for the short and medium term periods respectively. δ: correlation coefficient adjuster.  
Note 3: Correlation coefficients are adjusted for heteroscedasticity using Equation 2.  
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Table 5: International exchange rates returns conditional (unadjusted) correlation coefficients in 2011 Japanese earthquake 
 
Regions 
 
Countries 
Full period Stable Period Short-term turmoil period Medium-term turmoil period 
       ρ      σ       ρ       σ          ρ      σ Z-test Co         ρ         σ     Z-test Co 
 
South Asia 
and South-
East Asia 
India -0.136 0.004 -0.130 0.005 -0.282 0.002 -0.807 N -0.207 0.002 -0.560 N 
Malaysia -0.197 0.004 -0.191 0.005 -0.332 0.002 -0.773 N -0.267 0.003 -0.570 N 
Philippines -0.129 0.004 -0.128 0.005 -0.439 0.003 -1.746 N -0.143 0.003 -0.105 N 
Singapore -0.029 0.003 -0.015 0.004 -0.197 0.003 -0.940 N -0.109 0.003 -0.674 N 
Thailand 0.061 0.002 0.066 0.004 0.235 0.002 0.885 N 0.023 0.002 -0.307 N 
              
East Asia 
and North-
East Asia 
China 0.030 0.001 0.018 0.004 -0.090 0.001 -0.551 N 0.085 0.001 0.482 N 
Hong  Kong -0.049 0.000 -0.020 0.004 -0.223 0.000 -1.049 N -0.225 0.000 -1.481 N 
Taiwan -0.104 0.003 -0.080 0.004 -0.400 0.002 -1.748 N -0.251 0.002 -1.256 N 
South Korea -0.242 0.007 -0.226 0.007 -0.500 0.005 -1.630 N -0.415 0.004 -1.508 N 
              
Australasia Australia -0.080 0.007 -0.042 0.007 -0.428 0.006 -2.120 N -0.325 0.006 -2.099 N 
New Zealand -0.031 0.007 0.035 0.007 -0.612 0.007 -3.812 N -0.419 0.006 -3.432 N 
              
North 
America 
Canada -0.272 0.006 -0.275 0.006 -0.390 0.004 -0.662 N -0.274 0.004 0.010 N 
Mexico -0.338 0.005 -0.339 0.006 -0.521 0.003 -1.151 N -0.385 0.004 -0.378 N 
              
South 
America  
Argentina -0.030 0.001 -0.026 0.001 -0.024 0.001 0.010 N -0.059 0.001 -0.237 N 
Brazil -0.205 0.006 -0.181 0.006 -0.415 0.005 -1.316 N -0.356 0.006 -1.347 N 
Chile 0.012 0.005 0.046 0.006 -0.281 0.004 -1.707 N -0.234 0.004 -2.028 N 
              
Europe Euro 0.166 0.006 0.211 0.006 -0.204 0.004 -2.151 N -0.079 0.006 -2.094 N 
U.K 0.043 0.005 0.073 0.005 -0.211 0.005 -1.467 N -0.147 0.004 -1.576 N 
              
 
 
Middle 
East and 
Africa 
Bahrain -0.021 0.006 -0.014 0.000 -0.029 0.000 -0.077 N -0.043 0.000 -0.208 N 
Egypt 0.037 0.001 0.022 0.001 0.133 0.001 0.566 N 0.194 0.001 1.239 N 
Jordan -0.026 0.001 -0.024 0.001 -0.131 0.000 -0.548 N -0.036 0.000 -0.088 N 
Kuwait 0.247 0.001 0.258 0.001 0.182 0.001 -0.408 N 0.187 0.001 -0.533 N 
Qatar  0.037 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.211 0.000 0.994 N 0.178 0.000 1.072 N 
Saudi Arabia -0.027 0.000 0.005 0.000 -0.334 0.000 -1.795 N -0.194 0.000 -1.431 N 
UAE -0.086 0.000 -0.094 0.001 -0.211 0.005 n.a n.a -0.037 0.000 0.406 N 
South  Africa -0.130 0.007 -0.074 0.007 -0.601 0.007 -3.170 N -0.448 0.007 -2.906 N 
              
Other Russia -0.140 0.004 -0.132 0.005 -0.377 0.003 -1.347 N -0.211 0.004 -0.580 N 
Note 1: *, **, ***: statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. n.a: the presence of zero exchange rate return for all periods of the series.  
Note 2: The table shows conditional (unadjusted) cross-market correlation coefficients (ρ) and standard deviations (σ) for Japan and other stock indexes. The test statistics are obtained from Fisher Z transformations. 
The stable period is defined as the 12-month pre-earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011). The short-term turmoil period is defined as the 1-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to April 10, 
2011). The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the 2-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011). The full period is the stable period plus the medium-term turmoil period. Co: contagion 
.While “Y” denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, “N” indicates that the test statistics was less or equal to the critical value and no contagion occurred.  
Note 3: Correlation coefficients are unadjusted for heteroscedasticity.  
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Table 6: International exchange rates returns unconditional (adjusted) correlation coefficients in 2011 Japanese earthquake 
 
Regions 
 
Countries 
Full period Stable Period Short-term turmoil period Medium-term turmoil period 
    ρ      σ ρ*stp ρ*mtp        ρ*      δ Z-test Co       ρ*      δ Z-test Co 
 
South Asia 
and South-
East Asia 
India -0.136 0.004 -0.181 -0.168 -0.379 -0.487 -1.104 N -0.265 -0.408 -0.721 N 
Malaysia -0.197 0.004 -0.262 -0.245 -0.441 -0.510 -1.045 N -0.339 -0.356 -0.728 N 
Philippines -0.129 0.004 -0.178 -0.166 -0.564 -0.267 -2.341 N -0.184 -0.281 -0.136 N 
Singapore -0.029 0.003 -0.021 -0.020 -0.270 -0.154 -1.304 N -0.141 -0.088 -0.874 N 
Thailand 0.061 0.002 0.092 0.086 0.320 -0.282 1.222 N 0.030 -0.194 -0.399 N 
              
East Asia 
and North-
East Asia 
China 0.030 0.001 0.024 0.023 -0.126 -0.142 -0.769 N 0.110 0.135 0.626 N 
Hong  Kong -0.049 0.000 -0.029 -0.027 -0.304 0.072 -1.453 N -0.287 -0.099 -1.913 N 
Taiwan -0.104 0.003 -0.112 -0.104 -0.520 -0.065 -2.367 N -0.320 -0.085 -1.617 N 
South Korea -0.242 0.007 -0.308 -0.289 -0.628 -0.322 -2.138 N -0.510 -0.375 -1.892 N 
              
Australasia Australia -0.080 0.007 -0.059 -0.055 -0.552 -0.096 -2.868 N -0.407 -0.142 -2.690 N 
New Zealand -0.031 0.007 0.049 0.046 -0.734 -0.051 -5.032 N -0.515 -0.078 -4.378 N 
              
North 
America 
Canada -0.272 0.006 -0.371 -0.349 -0.509 -0.275 -0.878 N -0.347 -0.260 0.013 N 
Mexico -0.338 0.005 -0.449 -0.424 -0.649 -0.407 -1.480 N -0.476 -0.350 -0.470 N 
              
South 
America  
Argentina -0.030 0.001 -0.261 -0.033 -0.033 -0.261 0.013 N -0.077 -0.067 -0.308 N 
Brazil -0.205 0.006 -0.246 -0.233 -0.537 -0.231 -1.761 N -0.444 -0.072 -1.708 N 
Chile 0.012 0.005 0.064 -0.072 -0.378 -0.253 -2.359 N -0.444 -0.233 -2.622 N 
              
Europe Euro 0.166 0.006 0.289 0.271 -0.280 -0.231 -2.983 N -0.103 -0.001 -2.712 N 
U.K 0.043 0.005 0.102 0.095 -0.289 -0.074 -2.038 N -0.190 -0.150 -2.045 N 
              
 
 
Middle 
East and 
Africa 
Bahrain -0.021 0.006 -0.019 -0.018 -0.041 9.215 -0.107 N -0.056 6.189 -0.271 N 
Egypt 0.037 0.001 0.031 0.029 0.184 -0.400 0.788 N 0.249 -0.496 1.603 N 
Jordan -0.026 0.001 -0.034 -0.031 -0.181 -0.560 -0.763 N -0.047 -0.495 -0.114 N 
Kuwait 0.247 0.001 0.349 0.328 0.250 -0.419 -0.557 N 0.240 -0.338 -0.681 N 
Qatar  0.037 0.000 0.041 0.038 0.289 -0.500 1.308 N 0.229 -0.649 1.387 N 
Saudi Arabia -0.027 0.000 0.006 0.006 -0.444 0.079 -2.464 N -0.249 0.025 -1.852 N 
UAE -0.086 0.000 -0.131 -0.122 n.a -1.000 n.a n.a -0.048 -0.816 0.526 N 
South  Africa -0.130 0.007 -0.103 -0.095 -0.725 0.003 -2.038 N -0.545 -0.041 -3.676 N 
              
Other Russia -0.140 0.004 -0.183 -0.170 -0.494 -0.316 -1.821 N -0.270 -0.187 -0.746 N 
Note 1: *, **, ***: statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Note 2: The table shows conditional (unadjusted) cross-market correlation coefficients (ρ), adjuster for heteroscedasticity (δ) and standard deviations (σ) for Japan and other stock indexes. The test statistics are obtained 
from Fisher Z transformations. The stable period is defined as the 12-month pre-earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011). The short-term turmoil period is defined as the 1-month post-earthquake period 
(March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011). The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the 2-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011). The full period is the stable period plus the medium-term 
turmoil period. Co: contagion .While “Y” denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, “N” indicates that the test statistics was less or equal to the critical value and no 
contagion occurred. ρ*stp, ρ*mtp, denote  adjusted correlation coefficients for the short and medium term periods respectively. δ: correlation coefficient adjuster.  
Note 3: Correlation coefficients are adjusted for heteroscedasticity using Equation 2.
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4.3.3 Discussion of results, policy implications and future research directions 
 This section has examined if the March 2011 Japanese earthquake, tsunami and 
nuclear disaster affected the stability of the correlation structure in international stock and 
foreign exchange markets. 
 On a first note, with regard to international equity markets, there is substantial 
evidence of contagion in Taiwan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. The effect on 
Saudi Arabia was not unexpected because it is one of the four countries from which a large 
part of Japan’s imports in raw material source. For the other three, cross-market correlations 
strengthened only with China and Australia in the short-run, although insignificant to account 
for contagion. A possible explanation as to why Saudi Arabia was most strongly affected both 
in the immediate and medium terms may be seen from Japan’s boost in fuel imports in 
substitution to energy formerly provided by the wrecked Fukushima nuclear plants. Bahrain, 
being an oil-export driven economy (like her sisterly neighbor Saudi Arabia), could not have 
been victim of a different fate. As for Taiwan, as pointed-out by Asongu (2012b), Japan is its 
second largest trading partner and official estimates on the effect of the Japanese earthquake 
on the Taiwanese economy stand at a yearly fall in growth by 0.2% of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).  
Secondly, international foreign exchange market results show no presence of 
contagion. Accordingly, one would have expected the widespread disruption to Japan’s 
US$5.5 trillion economy to inevitably affect other countries in the Asia-Pacific region and 
beyond. Regional trade would immediately have been affected by the damage to Japanese 
ports. The unexpected findings could be explained by the fact that, major Japanese 
manufacturers of automobiles, semiconductors, computers and other goods immediately took 
advantage of their international supply chains and production networks. Thus, moving 
production elsewhere in Asia or to North America, where capacity utilization is still low. 
Moreover, since Japanese factories generally produce consumer goods rather than 
intermediate products, disruptions to outbound shipments should not have been expected to 
seriously affect production processes in other countries.  
 On managing and mitigating spillovers and contagion, it is worth emphasizing that 
globalization comes with costs and benefits. Therefore, managing financial market contagion 
resulting from natural disasters requires that governments minimize the costs and maximize 
the benefits of financial market integration. Most countries in the sample have undoubtedly 
benefited from integration, however based on the weight of empirical evidence above; 
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measures need to be taken in an effort to manage the downside ramifications of integration in 
the event of a natural disaster.  
The following are some recommendations policy makers need to take into account in 
order to minimize (mitigate) the adverse financial market effects of disasters. (1) The banking 
system of a country should not be directly exposed to foreign assets that natural disasters can 
easily stress and render worthless. This recommendation also applies to assets in institutions 
that natural disasters could make futile. Accordingly, this caution would attenuate the knock-
on effects through monetary, financial and real channels. (2) Domestic financial markets 
(equity, money, foreign exchange and credit markets) may also suffer due to the ‘substitution 
effect’. As credit channels and credit lines in the affected (or contaminated) countries run dry, 
some of the credit-demand earlier met by overseas financing could easily shift to the domestic 
sector and put pressure on domestic resources. The reversal of capital flows arising from the 
de-leveraging process could put pressure on the foreign exchange market, leading to sharp 
fluctuations in overnight money market rates and undue depreciation of currency. Hence, it is 
in the interest of central banks to adopt a monetary policy stance that is adequate to growth, 
inflation and financial stability concerns. (3) In circumstances where the natural disaster 
mirrors an expected decline in inflation, it is also in the interest of the central bank to adjust 
its monetary stance and manage liquidity: both domestic and foreign exchange to ensure that 
credit continues to flow for productive activities at both aggregate and sector specific levels. 
(4) In order to enable economic agents plan their business activities with more assurance, the 
central bank could ensure an orderly adjustment of the pain of its policies by maintaining a 
comfortable liquidity position: ensuring that the weighted average overnight money market 
rate is maintained within the repo-reverse repo corridor (margin) and ensure conditions 
conducive for flow of credit to productive sectors (particularly the stressed export industry 
sectors).  
Before we conclude this section, it is important to highlight the implications of this 
paper to the future of natural disasters. Though the crisis is over, from a financial standpoint 
the following concerns on future natural disasters are most likely to preoccupy policymakers. 
(1) Is self-insurance a viable (and/or feasible) option for emerging economies? In other terms, 
could the accumulation of foreign reserves buffer against financial market crises cropping-up 
from natural disasters? Whether these reserves derive from current account surpluses (China 
for example) or capital flows (India for instance), relying on them to hedge contagion could 
still represent some form of liability. This draws to mind the need of finding a way of 
balancing the trade-off between ‘vulnerability to financial contagion’ and ‘vulnerability to 
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trade contagion’ in the event of a disaster. Another imperative strand within this framework 
points to the redundancy of self-insurance if international arrangements (regional and 
multilateral) could provide easy, quick and unconditional liquidity during such crises 
(Asongu, 2012b). (2) How do policy makers keep the financial sector consistent with the real 
sector in case of a natural disaster? Forgotten and abandoned in the euphoria of financial 
alchemy is the basic tenet that the financial sector has no standing of its own. Hence, it 
derives its strength and resilience from the real economic sector. Thinking the other way 
round has led many into believing that, substantial value could be created by slicing and 
dicing securities. (3) How should regulatory arbitrage be addressed in times of crisis? If 
under the nose of regulators, grows a broad, extensive and complex network of a ‘shadow 
banking system’ that encourages loose practices, hunt for quick yields and ‘non-transparent 
and risky’ financial products, when  systems unravel (due to natural disasters), many of these 
institutions will pose a systematic risk to the financial systems. Therefore, the regulatory 
architecture has to be modeled (and/or fashioned) to keep pace with innovation and the 
possibility of natural shocks. (4) Simulating natural disasters and learning how to manage 
global imbalances resulting from them could also help countries brace for potential financial 
and real sector consequences of natural crises. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Financial integration among economies has the benefit of improving allocation 
efficiency and risk diversification. However the recent global financial crisis, considered as 
the most severe since the Great Depression has re-ignited a fierce debate about the merits of 
financial globalization and its implications for growth especially in developing countries. A 
section in this chapter has examined whether equity markets in emerging countries were 
vulnerable to contagion during the recent global financial meltdown. Findings have  shown: 
(1) with the exceptions of India and Dhaka,  Asian markets were worst hit; (2) but for Peru, 
Venezuela and Columbia, Latin American countries were least affected; (3) Africa and 
Middle East emerging markets were averagely contaminated with the exceptions of Kenya, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Morocco, Dubai, Jordan, Israel, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. The 
results have two important policy implications. Firstly, we have confirmed that Latin America 
was most prepared to brace the financial crisis, implying their fiscal and monetary policies 
could serve as a benchmark for other emerging economies. Secondly, we have confirmed that, 
the strategic opening of the current and capital accounts based on the available weight of 
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empirical evidence for a given region/country (as practiced by India) is a caution against 
global economic and financial shocks.   
The effects of natural disasters on financial markets are important in investment 
decisions, as the benefits of portfolio diversification are severely limited during periods of 
high volatility and increased cross-market correlations. In the fourth section of the chapter, we 
have used unadjusted and adjusted correlation coefficients to test for contagion effects across 
33 economies in the aftermath of the Japanese earthquake, ensuing tsunami and worst nuclear 
crisis in recent history. Results have shown that, no international foreign exchange market 
experienced significantly stronger correlations with the Japanese Yen two months into the 
crises. However, with respect to international stock markets, Taiwan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia 
and South Africa experienced contagion. The results have two paramount implications. 
Firstly, we have confirmed the existing consensus that in the face of natural crises that could 
take an international scale, only emerging markets are overwhelmingly affected .Secondly, we 
have also shown that international financial market transmissions not only occur during 
financial crisis; natural disaster effects should not be undermined. Other policy implications 
and future research directions have been discussed. 
 
References  
 
[1] Anoruo, E., and Mustafa, M. 2007. An empirical investigation into the relation of oil to 
stock market prices.  North American Journal of Finance and Banking Research, 1(1):1-15.  
 
[2] Asongu, S. A. 2011. Political Crises and Risk of Financial Contagion in Developing 
Countries: Evidence from Africa. Journal of Economics and International Finance, 3(7):462-
467.  
 
[3] Asongu, S. A. 2012a. Globalization, financial crisis and contagion: time-dynamic 
evidence from financial markets of developing countries. Journal of Advanced Studies in 
Finance: Forthcoming.  
 
[4] Asongu, S. A. 2012b. The 2011 Japanese earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crisis: evidence 
of contagion from international financial markets. Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 
4(4):340-353.  
 
[5] Asongu, S. A. 2012c. Are the financial benefits of financial globalization questionable 
until greater domestic financial development has taken place?. Journal of Economic Studies: 
Forthcoming.  
 
[6] Calvo, G.A., Leiderman, L., and Reinhart, C.A. 1996. Inflows of capital to developing 
countries in the 1990s.  Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10:123-139.  
 
 26 
[7] Collins. D., and Biekpe, N. 2003. Contagion: a fear for African equity markets? Journal of 
Economics and Business, 55:285-297.  
 
[8] Coulibaly, B. 2009. Effects of financial autarky and integration: The case of South Africa 
embargo.  Journal of International Money and Finance, 28:454-478. 
 
[9] Demyanyk, Y., and  Volosovych, V. 2008. Gains from financial integration in the 
European Union: Evidence for new and old members.  Journal of International Money and 
Finance, 27:277-294.  
 
[10] Forbes, K. J. 2000. The Asian flu and Russian virus: firm-level evidence on how crises 
are transmitted internationally. NBER Working Paper 7807. 
 
[11] Forbes, K., and Rigobon, R. 2002. No contagion, only interdependence: measuring stock 
market co-movements, Journal of Finance, 57(5):2223–2261. 
 
[12] Frankel, J. and Rose, A.K. 1996. Currency crashes in emerging markets: An empirical 
treatment. Journal of International Economics, 41:351-366.  
 
[13] Henry, P.B. 2007. Capital Account Liberalization: Theory, Evidence and Speculation. 
Journal of Economic Literature,  XLV:887-935. 
 
[14] In, F., Cui, J., and Mahraj, A. 2008. The Impact of a new term auction facility on 
LIBOR-OIS spreads and volatility transmission between money and mortgage market. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1272806 (unpublished manuscript).  
 
[15] Ji, P. I., and In, F. 2010. The Impact of the global financial crisis on the cross-currency 
linkage of LIBOR-OIS spreads. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Money, 20:575-589. 
 
[16] Kanas, A. 1998. Linkages between the US and European equity markets: further 
evidence from cointegration test. Applied Financial Economics, 8 (6):607–614. 
 
[17] King, M., Sentana, E., and Wadhwani, S.1994. Volatility and links between national 
stock markets. Econometrica, 62 (4):901–933. 
 
[18] King, M., and Wadhwani, S. 1990. Transmission of volatility between stock markets. 
Review of Financial Studies, 3(1):5–33. 
 
[19] Kose, M. A., Prasad., E.S., and Taylor, A.D. 2011. Thresholds in the process of 
international financial integration. Journal of International Money and Finance, 30:147-179.   
 
[20] Lee. H., Wu. H. and Wang. Y. 2007. Contagion effect in financial markets after the 
South-East Asia Tsunami. Research in International Business and Finance, 21:281-296.  
 
[21] McAndrews, J., Sarkar, A., and Wang, Z. 2008. The Effects of the term auction facility 
on the London inter-bank offered rate. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports No. 
335.  
 
 27 
[22] Obstfeld, M. 1986. Rational and self-fulfilling balance of payments crises. American 
Economic Review, 76:72–81. 
 
[23] Schmukler, S. L. 2004. Financial Globalization: gain and pain for developing countries. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review: 39-66.  
 
[24] Taylor, J.B., and Williams, J. C. (2008). Further results on a black swan in the money 
market. Stanford Institute for Economic Policy, Research Discussion Paper 07-046. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
